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Abstract: 
Economic historians often take for granted the idea that financial centres have followed one 
standard bottom-up development process, gradually evolving from commercial hubs to banking 
places. This chapter suggests that such an interpretation is rather simplistic. The analysis is 
focused on a remarkable counterexample: the sudden emergence of Brussels as an international 
financial centre in the mid-19th century. The case-study is articulated into five parts, each one 
looking at a different aspect of the growth of the new centre (capital resources, business elites, 
regulation, the domestic money market, and the foreign exchange market). The conclusion is that 
the top-down process observed in the Brussels experience sheds light on the fact that semi-
institutional actors (such as central banks, or commercial banks connected to the political power) 
can successfully enact specific policies aimed at enhancing local financial development. 
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It is often taken for granted that the historical path followed by developing financial centres 
has been more or less the same in all cases: as synthesized by Charles Kindleberger, a ‘staple 
theory’ of finance has been constructed, according to which ‘banking starts out to serve the 
needs of sovereigns and nobles; develops in connection with commerce; then less personally 
with governmental finance; next with transport, including shipping, canals, turnpikes, and 
railroads; then with industry; and finally with intermediation in insurance, mortgages, 
consumer finance, factoring, pension funds, and the like’2. Yet, a lot of examples do not seem 
to fit into this linear scheme: for instance, there are important commercial hubs that never 
developed banking activities, while there are banking centres that were never significantly 
involved in financing trade or sovereign debt. In this respect, the emergence of Brussels as an 
international financial centre during the 19th century is a particularly interesting case, not only 
because of its apparently ‘atypical’ course (a jump start to the industry phase), but also 
because of its impressively rapid success3. Such features make the Brussels case very relevant 
for a reflection on our current understanding of the determinants of financial development. 
Even though many aspects of Belgian economic history have been studied in the last decades, 
a proper assessment of the reasons that led to the concentration of financial activities in what 
then was a rather peripheral city is still missing to date. This gap in the literature is perhaps to 
be attributed to the fact that scholars have mostly looked at this process as the natural 
outcome of some broader phenomena taking place at that time. On the one hand, in line with 
the traditional emphasis on industrialization, the process has been seen as the side effect of 
Belgium’s economic take-off during those years4. On the other hand, echoing the early-20th-
century perception of Brussels as a sort of offshore financial centre (see below), it has been 
interpreted as the product of laissez-faire legislation – especially the stock exchange 
liberalization of 1867 and the corporate law reform of 18735. However, despite including 
many elements of truth, both interpretations fail to provide a satisfactory explanation. On the 
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 Charles P. Kindleberger, “The Formation of Financial Centers: A Study in Comparative Economic History”, in 
Richard Roberts (ed.), International Financial Centres: Concepts, Development and Dynamics, I (Aldershot: 
Elgar, 1994), pp. 191-268, esp. p. 199. 
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 Youssef Cassis, Capitals of Capital: A History of International Financial Centres 1780-2005 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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 See e.g. Herman Van der Wee and Martine Goossens, “Belgium”, in Rondo E. Cameron and Valeriĭ I. Bovykin 
(eds.), International Banking 1870-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 113-129. 
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Economic Growth in Belgium”, Explorations in Economic History 43:1 (2006), pp. 13-38. 
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one hand, even not mentioning the fact that by the first world war Belgium was perhaps more 
financially advanced than any other industrial power6, the idea that such a development was 
led by real growth fails to explain why it was the then peripheral Brussels market to become 
the centre of Belgian industrial finance instead of any other one – most notably, the already 
established Antwerp market7. On the other hand, the timing of the process shows that laissez-
faire reforms probably played a role in priming the boom of the Brussels stock exchange at 
the eve of the first world war, but not its first take-off in the central part of the 19th century8. 
Figure 1 shows the number of securities listed on the official bulletin of the Brussels bourse 
(Cours authentique de la bourse de Bruxelles) in the years before 1870 for which this 
publication is available. It appears that the turning point in the centre’s expansion and 
internationalization took place during the 1850s: while in the first half of the century domestic 
equities dominated the exchange, the number of foreign securities listed kept growing 
thereafter9. However, besides being unavailable for many years, this series suffers from an 
additional shortcoming: the fact that securities were listed does not necessarily mean that they 
were actually traded. Trading volumes at that time could actually be close to zero for a long 
time for many of the securities officially listed at the exchange. Yet volumes are impossible to 
assess, unless through proxies. In order to overcome this problem, the same kind of survey as 
in figure 1 is performed in figure 2.1 by using the listings published by Belgium’s most 
important newspaper of the time, L’Indépendance belge: the idea is that the press provided 
information concerning securities actually traded on a significant scale, and omitted those 
lacking interest from the general public. The picture completes and confirms the previous 
                                                          
6
 Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, “The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 
20th Century”, Journal of Financial Economics 69 (2003), pp. 5-50, esp. pp. 15-17. 
7
 During the early decades of the 19th century, Antwerp had regained a relevant position as an international 
commercial hub, enjoying from established exchange relationships with the most important financial centres: see 
Hilde Greefs, “Exploiting International Webs of Relations: Immigrants and the Reopening of the Harbour of 
Antwerp on the Eve of the Nineteenth Century”, in Adrian Jarvis and Robert Lee (eds.), Trade, Migration and 
Urban Networks in Port Cities c.1640-c.1840, (St. John’s: Maritime History Publications, 2008), pp. 81-107. 
Although trading in securities was not among Antwerp’s main specializations, a priori the city was much better 
placed than Brussels as a candidate for the development of a national equity market. 
8
 Data on the number of equities listed on the Brussels bourse over the long run can be found in Van 
Nieuwerburgh, Buelens, and Cuyvers, “Stock Market Development”. Notice that unlike those presented here, 
their data do not cover other classes of securities – like corporate or sovereign bonds. 
9
 By the 1860s, Brussels was ready to host large-scale international financial ventures, such as e.g. the infamous 
Langrand-Dumonceau enterprise: Guillaume Jacquemyns, Langrand-Dumonceau promoteur d’une puissance 
financière catholique, I-V (Brussels: Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1960-1965). 
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findings: not only the two waves of expansion (the late 1830s, and then the 1850s)10, but also 
the retrenchment of the 1840s (when trading volumes of many equities evaporated 
completely) can be observed. The dependence of Brussels’ very first emergence on the 
floatation of domestic equities appears even more striking if compared with the evolution of 
the Antwerp bourse during the same years (figure 2.2). A much more international market for 
sovereign bonds before 1835, Antwerp remained almost completely untouched by the 
incorporation booms of the late 1830s and 1850s, and was since relegated to a second-stage 
role11. 
What were the determinants of Brussels’ take-off as a national and international financial 
centre? In the spirit of this book, this chapter aims at providing some answers by reviewing 
the main aspects of this process. Section 1 focuses on capital resources available on place, and 
on the domestic investing public. Section 2 deals with the composition of the Brussels 
business elite, and the connections this provided with the foreign investing public. Section 3 is 
about domestic regulation and taxation. Section 4 examines the performance of the national 
currency and the features of the domestic money market. Section 5 covers the foreign 
exchange market. The last section concludes. 
 
Figures 1, 2.1, and 2.2 about here 
 
 
 
1. Capital Resources and the Domestic Investing Public 
 
When in 1822 king William I of the Netherlands started planning the foundation of a bank of 
issue in Brussels, an anonymous advisor warned him that ‘like almost all the towns and cities 
of the [Southern] provinces, Brussels only possesses a manufacturing industry and consumer-
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 Limited to the early 1850s, an apparent discrepancy exists between the two surveys. These years look like a 
period of stagnation in figure 1, and of expansion in figure 2.1. The reason is the following. In the event of the 
restructuration of the banking sector that followed the 1848 crisis, many of the shares issued in the 1830s (which 
had hardly traded during the 1840s) were finally delisted; in the meantime, a number of new equities were 
floated. L’Indépendance belge had not been mentioning untraded securities since 1842, while the official bulletin 
had been bound to continue to do that; as a result, figure 1 only shows the balance of the substitution process 
between old untraded securities and newly floated ones. 
11
 Karel Veraghtert, “Bruxelles éclipse Anvers: Le centre boursier belge se déplace 1800-1840”, in Geert De 
Clercq (ed.), À la bourse: Histoire du marché des valeurs en Belgique 1300-1990 (Louvain-la-Neuve: Duclot, 
1992), pp. 167-178. 
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based trade. There are, without a doubt, more genuine speculators and investors in 
Amsterdam than there are in the whole of Belgium. Belgium is, generally speaking, an 
affluent country with wealthy property owners, but few private individuals there have large 
cash sums available or circulating’12. Also in 1822, one leading Antwerp banker stated that in 
the Southern part of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, people were used to ‘blindly 
follow the suggestions of some prominent notaries for investing their patrimony, yet these 
ones just put their [customers’] wealth in real estate – either in outright purchases or in 
mortgages’13. Although such claims were perhaps exaggerated, the illiquidity of the Belgian 
capital market during the Dutch period is a fact confirmed by many pieces of evidence. A 
handful of securities – almost exclusively sovereign bonds – were officially listed at the 
Belgian bourses, but the extent to which such assets were diffused among the public seems to 
have been rather limited. The establishment of Société Générale (SG), the first joint-stock 
bank operating in Belgium, does not appear to have enhanced the mobilization of local 
capital, as in its early years the bank mostly devoted to managing its real-estate endowment, 
acting as the Treasury’s agent in the South, and financing the Dutch public debt14. Neither did 
the first appearance of municipal savings banks provide much more liquidity to the banking 
system, as the new institutions hardly prospered in the late 1820s15. 
The events of 1830 marked a revolution in the structure of Belgium’s embryonic financial 
system. On the one hand, SG freed itself from the control of its largest shareholder (i.e. 
William I himself, whose stake was frozen by the directors of the bank)16 and thus lost of its 
status of a de facto State bank. On the other hand, most of the municipal savings banks – 
which were invested in Dutch sovereign bonds – were severely hit by the impairment of the 
Netherlands’ credit. As a result, many smaller savings banks failed, while three of them (those 
of Brussels, Ghent, and Liège) were absorbed by SG. In order to perform its role as the 
Treasury’s agent, the bank had developed a dense network of more than sixty agencies 
                                                          
12
 René Brion and Jean-Louis Moreau, The Société Générale de Belgique 1822-1997 (Antwerp: Fonds Mercator, 
1998), p. 19. 
13
 Ben Serge Chlepner, La banque en Belgique: Étude historique et économique, I (Brussels: Lamertin, 1926), p. 
21. 
14
 Robert Demoulin, Guillaume Ier et la transformation économique des Provinces Belges 1815-1830 (Liège-
Paris: Université de Liège-Droz, 1938), pp. 71-104. 
15
 Els Witte, “Les origines des caisses d’épargne en Belgique 1825-1850”, in Bernard Vogler (ed.), L’histoire 
des caisses d’épargne européennes, I (Paris: Éditions de l’Épargne, 1991), pp. 171-189, esp. pp. 172-173. 
16
 Helma Houtman-De Smedt, “La Société Générale de 1822 à 1848: Évolution de la «banque foncière» à la 
«banque mixte»”, in Herman Van der Wee (ed.), La Générale de Banque 1822-1997 (Brussels: Racine, 1997), 
pp. 13-62, esp. pp 38-53. 
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throughout the country; after the nearly disappearance of savings banking, SG conceived the 
idea of building on its local agencies in order to develop the collection of deposits and 
centralize their management. The outcome of these events was a very peculiar one. In most 
European countries, savings banking remained tied to a municipal and philanthropic 
dimension, in which available funds used to be invested in either microcredit initiatives or 
sovereign (and sub-sovereign) loans. Conversely, in the newborn Kingdom of Belgium 
savings banking was dethatched from such a small-scale dimension, so that available funds 
were finally invested in major financial enterprises such as industrial development17. 
The consequences of this situation cannot be underestimated. Figure 3 shows the amounts of 
savings collected by Belgium’s two biggest banks, viz. SG and Banque de Belgique (the 
country’s second universal bank founded in 1835, hereafter BdB). Available evidence 
suggests that the total sums collected by all other banks were a trifle with respect to those 
collected by the two universal banks18: as a result, the figure covers by far the biggest part of 
the country’s total savings. The picture is impressive: after the opening of SG’s savings 
division in 1833, deposits grew by many million francs every year to top the fabulous sum of 
61.6 million francs at the end of 184219. Despite being Belgium’s second collector of savings, 
BdB – a smaller and Brussels-based corporation – never actually managed to compete with 
SG for depositors. Figure 4 displays the role of savings within the total liabilities of universal 
banks: in the case of SG, deposits accounted for 20-30% of the bank’s balance sheet 
throughout the period – a level never touched anymore in the company’s history20. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 about here 
 
The reasons for the success of SG’s savings division were not only dictated by the capillarity 
of the bank’s agency network. The conditions offered to depositors were very attractive: an 
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 Witte, “Les origines”, pp. 185-187. 
18
 Els Witte and Sabine Parmentier, “Les caisses d’épargne belges au cours de la première moitié du XIXe siècle: 
Une affaire de la haute finance appuyée par les pouvoirs publics”, in August Van Put, Chris De Noose, and Paul 
Tanghe (eds.), Les banques d’épargne belges: Histoire, droit, fonction économique et institutions (Tielt: Lannoo, 
1986), pp. 53-85. 
19
 To have an idea of the importance of this sum, consider that in 1843-1844 the average amount lent by the 
Bank of France – by far the biggest bank of a much larger economy than Belgium’s – only reached 155 million 
francs: Maurice Lévy-Leboyer, Les banques européennes et l’industrialisation internationale dans la première 
moitié du XIXe siècle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), p. 489. 
20
 Erik Buyst and Michelangelo Van Meerten, “La Société Générale et le développement économique de la 
Belgique”, in Van der Wee, La Générale, pp. 537-670, esp. pp. 556-557. 
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interest rate of 4% was allowed on deposits up to the rather high ceiling of 4,000 francs, and 
money could be withdrawn with only a few days’ advice21. The prospect of such a safe and 
remunerative form of investment proved successful in diverting the wealthy Belgians’ capital 
from real estate22, thus enhancing for the first time the liquidity of the banking system. The 
influx of cash allowed SG to launch its grand underwriting policy of industrial securities, 
which – together with a similar move by BdB – prompted the expansion of the Brussels stock 
exchange in the second half of the 1830s23. According to Chlepner24, the involvement of the 
general public in stock trading was very limited at the time: only a rather small group of 
agents – mostly tied to the universal banks themselves – was apparently involved in the 
speculative row of 1835-1838. If we buy this thesis, then we can conclude that the way the 
Belgian public provided the necessary resources to the expansion of the stock exchange 
passed through the intermediation of the savings divisions of universal banks, rather than 
through direct investment in securities. 
Large reliance on callable deposits, however, made banks particularly vulnerable to balance 
sheet mismatches in the event of crises. In 1839, the suspension of payments by BdB was 
only partially tied to its depositors’ attitude (see figure 4); yet in 1848, the extent of the 
savers’ run on SG counters alone was such a big shock on the bank’s balance (see figure 3) 
that only the issuance of unconvertible notes allowed for its survival. This latter crisis led 
universal banks to a deep rethinking of their activities in deposit collection: as an eminent 
member of SG’s post-crisis board, Jules Malou, pointed out in 1863, savings banking had to 
be seen as ‘a way for accumulating small sums, not a way for investing already piled-up 
capital’, as it was ‘based on two mutually inconsistent ideas, productivity and almost 
instantaneous callability of deposits’25. BdB closed down its savings division in 1852, while 
SG lowered the ceiling for interest-bearing deposits from 4,000 to 1,500 francs. During the 
1850s, SG’s savings collection stabilized around the post-crisis level – less than one half of 
                                                          
21
 Jules Malou, Notice historique sur la Société Générale pour favoriser l’industrie nationale établie à Bruxelles 
1823-1862 (Brussels: Decq, 1863), p. XV. 
22
 Some coeval observers pointed out that the advantageous conditions offered by Belgian banks de facto 
transformed the savers’ accounts into a proper form of investment – which increased the banks’ exposure to the 
risk of runs. In 1835, the average size of savers’ accounts at SG equaled 1,200 francs, while at the Paris 
municipal savings bank it only equaled 480 francs (Chlepner, La banque, p. 98). In an effort to correct for this 
situation, in 1838 and 1842 SG slightly worsened the conditions offered to large depositors; the move had a 
limited impact. 
23
 Stefano Ugolini, “Universal Banking and the Development of Secondary Corporate Debt Markets: Lessons 
from 1830s Belgium”, mimeo. 
24
 Chlepner, La banque, p. 94. 
25
 Malou, Notice, pp. 25-26. 
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the pre-crisis one. Moreover, the sharp decline in the amounts deposited at universal banks 
was not counterbalanced by the appearance of new big savings collectors at least until 1865, 
when the State-owned Caisse Générale d’Épargne et de Retraite was founded26. 
It is plausible to think that the disappearance of a very safe and remunerative form of 
investment – as bank deposits had been in the 1830s and 1840s – forced the Belgian wealthy 
to look for alternative assets, viz. for securities; this would have provided the stock exchange 
with fresh resources in the 1850s. Of course, such an interpretation – which builds on Malou’s 
somewhat exaggerated contempt of savings27 – should not be overemphasized. The limit 
imposed by SG’s savings division on interest-bearing deposits (4,000 francs) was actually a 
rather high ceiling, but Belgium’s florid upper class must have had liquid supplies largely 
exceeding such a threshold. This means that the loss of attractiveness of deposits probably 
played a role in making the middle classes (rather than the upper classes) familiar with 
securities28. In this view, more investigation would be needed in order to assess the validity of 
Chlepner’s thesis that the general public was not at all involved in stock trading in the 
1830s29. 
                                                          
26
 Caisse Générale d’Épargne et de Retraite (CGER), Mémorial 1865-1965 (Brussels: CGER, 1965), pp. 61-64. 
In presenting to the Parliament his plan for the foundation of CGER, the Finance Minister Frère-Orban declared 
that ‘during the last years, and especially after 1850, the number and the size of savings banks have grown 
remarkably in our neighbouring countries. We are the only ones to have remained stationary since 1840 – worse 
still, we must admit, we have even regressed’. 
27
 Malou wrote his Notice in 1863, at the time the Parliament was debating on the foundation of CGER – a plan 
to which, in his capacity of manager of a potential competitor (i.e. SG), he was fiercely opposed (CGER, 
Mémorial, pp. 85-107). As a consequence of this conflict of interests, Malou’s claims about the dangers of 
savings banking must be probably read as a sort of veiled scaremongering. 
28
 Describing Belgium’s financial system at the eve of the first world war, Walther Meynen pointed out that one 
of the peculiarities of this system rested on the degree of penetration of securities to the portfolios of almost all 
classes of the Belgian society, down to small savers. According to him, the general public was so well-
acquainted with this kind of assets that universal banks relied on a capillary network of brokers more than on 
direct over-the-counter transactions with their customers, when they were to place the securities they had 
underwritten. Although this description refers to a much later period than the one considered in this chapter, it is 
reasonable to hypothesize that such an extraordinary acquaintance of the Belgian public with the bourse had its 
roots in the much-lamented ‘disruption’ of savings banking activities in the country after the 1848 crisis. This 
would also provide one possible explanation for the early rise of a general demand for the liberalization of 
brokerage activities, which led to the 1867 reform of the Brussels stock exchange (see below). Walther Meynen, 
Das belgische Bankwesen (Berlin: Siemenroth, 1910), pp. 57-58. 
29
 Chlepner, La banque, p. 94, bases his thesis on a article published by L’Indépendance belge (26th September 
1836), stating that ‘shares issued by our joint-stock companies are far from being as widespread as people could 
think; some days ago, a Brussels newspaper admitted that in Antwerp – which is nonetheless at our gates – they 
were hardly known’. Yet since January 1837 Antwerp’s most important financial newspaper, Journal du 
commerce d’Anvers, regularly published the prices of industrial equities listed at the Brussels bourse – which 
means that public interest on these securities was growing beyond the capital’s city walls. 
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To sum up, during its first two decades as an independent State, Belgium found itself with a 
rather peculiar banking structure: savings collection was very early centralized by universal 
banks, which applied these resources to the underwriting business in the industrial sector. 
This enhanced the first development of the Brussels stock exchange, but also exposed banks 
to the risk of violent balance sheet mismatches – which eventually took place in 1839 and 
1848. After the latter crisis, universal banks imposed more penalising conditions on large 
deposits, thus encouraging the direct placement of these funds to securities. Nevertheless, the 
aggressive savings-collection policy enacted by banks during the 1830s and 1840s succeeded 
in mobilizing the capital of the Belgian middle class, which proved to be an irreversible 
process. When a new underwriting wave took place in the 1850s, a domestic reservoir of 
liquid funds was by then available to be invested in newly-issued securities. 
 
 
 
2. Business Elites (and the Foreign Investing Public) 
 
One striking aspect of the first expansion of the Brussels stock exchange during the 1830s is 
the fact that it took place in a rather insulated environment. This is reflected by the scarcity of 
connections between the local business elite and outer banking networks. Before the 
foundation of the first joint-stock banks, Brussels was host to a handful of private banks, 
mostly devoted to trade-related activities on a very small scale30. Together with some 
entrepreneurs, landowners, and politicians, these local bankers formed the bulk of the 
administrations of universal banks31. The Paris Rothschild house had appointed a permanent 
agent in Belgium’s capital city, but his activities were mostly related to the management of 
the country’s public debt32. Thus the financial elite that made the 1830s boom (and bust) was 
almost exclusively Brussels-based. These very circumstances provide perhaps the best 
explanation for the fact that the floatation of new Belgian industrial equities was enacted in 
Brussels rather than in the country’s main financial centre, i.e. Antwerp: lacking strong 
                                                          
30
 Ben Serge Chlepner, Le marché financier belge depuis cent ans (Brussels: Falk, 1930), pp. 14-16. 
31
 Ginette Kurgan-Van Hentenryk, Gouverner la Générale de Belgique: Essai de biographie collective (Brussels: 
De Boeck, 1996), pp. 16-21. 
32
 The Rothschilds appear to have had many concerns in the Belgian industry, but in these early years their 
business was generally run in close partnership with SG: on this issue, see Bertrand Gille, Lettres adressées à la 
maison Rothschild de Paris par son représentant à Bruxelles, I-II (Leuven-Paris: Nauwelaerts, 1961-1963). 
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contacts with the outer world, the closed and inward-looking elite that controlled the two 
universal banks had no other chance than developing the local equity market in order to be 
able to manage the process properly. 
The event that marked the end of this situation was the recapitalization of BdB by Jonathan-
Raphaël Bischoffsheim in 1841. A member (in law) of the Frankfurt Goldschmidt banking 
dynasty, Bischoffsheim sensed the great potential opportunities lying in Brussels’ highly-
leveraged (and highly-politicized) banking system, and consequently became one of the 
protagonists of its development. A leading administrator of BdB (1841-1850), of the National 
Bank of Belgium (hereafter NBB: 1851-1870), of many joint-stock companies affiliated to 
BdB, and of the most important Brussels-based merchant bank (his own, which became the 
Belgian branch of Paribas in 1872), Bischoffsheim dominated the national stage for nearly 
four decades33. Acquainted with a network of leading European merchant bankers (which he 
later turned into the NBB’s correspondent network: see below), he contributed to the 
integration of the city in the international financial system. Moreover, Bischoffsheim 
encouraged the venue to Brussels of that group of Jewish financiers, mostly connected with 
his family (Oppenheim, Goldschmidt, Hirsch, Errera, Cassel, Stern, Brugmann), that 
constituted the core of Belgium’s small albeit powerful private banking sector for decades34. 
The implantation of a cosmopolite business community since the 1840s played a crucial role 
in the internationalization of the Brussels stock exchange. According to Chlepner35, during the 
third quarter of the 19th century – which he calls the ‘age of splendour’ of Belgian merchant 
bankers – these businessmen were responsible for the floatation of the first bulk of foreign 
securities in Belgium36. 
To sum up, while the very first expansion of the Brussels bourse in the 1830s took place in a 
sort of vacuum – foreign players, as it was the case for the Rothschilds, mainly intervened 
through the intermediation of domestic agents –, the second wave of financial growth in the 
                                                          
33
 Pierre Kauch, “Jonathan-Raphaël Bischoffsheim 1808-1883”, Revue du personnel de la Banque Nationale de 
Belgique 1 (1951), pp. 5-23. 
34
 Samuel Tilman, Les grands banquiers belges 1830-1935: Portrait collectif d’une élite (Brussels: Académie 
Royale de Belgique, 2006), p. 343. The only important Brussels merchant bank that was not related to 
Bischoffsheim was the house of Samuel Lambert, the Rothschilds’ agent for Belgium. A fierce rivalry had 
always existed between the Rothschilds and the Bischoffsheims. After SG’s crisis in 1848, the Rothschilds 
loosened their contacts with the universal bank, and the Lambert house grew more and more independent on the 
Belgian stage (Gille, Lettres, passim). 
35
 Chlepner, Le marché, pp. 50-52 and 60-61. 
36
 Foreign securities were underwritten either directly by their houses or (more often) by the joint-stock banks 
(especially BdB) in which these financiers were leading administrators. 
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1850s happened in an environment that was much more interconnected with the international 
financial system. Although the structure of the domestic financial system did not change 
substantially – Belgian universal banks continued to dominate the market –, the evolution in 
the composition of the local business elite opened new transmission channels between 
Belgium’s capital city and the most important foreign places. This process laid the basis for 
the internationalization of the Brussels stock exchange – which was to reach extraordinary 
levels at the beginning of the 20th century. 
 
 
 
3. Regulation and Taxation 
 
As it has been already pointed out, scholars have put much emphasis on the 1867 and 1873 
reforms as the main steps of a process of full liberalization that, combined with the absence of 
corporate taxes on revenues and dividends, allegedly led to the expansion of the Brussels 
stock exchange37. This conveys the idea of Belgium as an ante litteram offshore financial 
centre that profited from capital flights from the neighbouring countries. 
No doubts, lax regulation and low taxes played an important role in boosting the international 
competitiveness of the Belgian financial centre; yet this was only true in the period following 
1880, when more restrictive legislation was passed and taxation raised in most European 
countries38. In other words, in the decades preceding 1914 Brussels became a more attractive 
place because other countries tightened regulation, not because Belgium relaxed its own39. As 
a result, it is difficult to indicate the Belgian laissez-faire legislation as a distinctive factor of 
the Brussels financial take-off in the mid-19th century. 
                                                          
37
 Van Nieuwerburgh, Buelens, and Cuyvers, “Stock Market Development”. 
38
 Théophile Théate, Les sociétés anonymes: Abus et Remèdes (Brussels-Leipzig: Misch & Thron, 1905); Hans 
Willems and Frans Buelens, “Regulation of the Stock Exchange in an Emerging Market, between Law and 
Practice: The Belgian Case 1801-1867”, mimeo. 
39
 ‘In Germany the income tax was levied on a tax return assessment basis, which had the inconvenience of 
violating secrecy. Conversely, in Belgium the income tax was levied on a pay-as-you-earn basis, which had the 
advantage of preserving anonymity. As a result, German capital emigrated to a certain extent towards the 
Brussels bourse. Likewise, in France the regulation of the Paris bourse and the conflict between coulisse and 
parquet produced the effect of increasing the importance of the Brussels market. This made Mr Caillaux, 
rapporteur of the French Lower House commission on the income tax, ask ‘if German and French legislators had 
agreed in making Belgium the promised land of commerce, finance, and industry’ [25th March 1900]’. Roland 
Durviaux, La banque mixte, origine et soutien de l’expansion économique de la Belgique (Brussels: Bruylant, 
1947), p. 72. 
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A quick look at the regulatory framework during the first years of life of the Kingdom of 
Belgium seems to suggest that the impact of the liberalization process of the 1860s and 1870s 
has probably been overestimated. Since the Napoleonic age and throughout the Dutch period, 
the country had stuck to the Code de Commerce – which provided it with an internationally 
recognized legal standard adopted by the whole Continental region that had previously joined 
the French Empire. The Code imposed rather strict rules on brokerage activities (a monopoly 
of agents appointed by the political power) and on incorporation (subject to governmental 
authorisation). Yet it does not seem that this legislation ever really threatened to harm the 
growth of financial activities. On the one hand, the brokers’ monopoly was systematically 
circumvented through the development of a curb market (viz. the so-called Lloyd bruxellois, 
the Brussels equivalent to the Paris coulisse)40. On the other hand, formal governmental 
control proved rather ineffective in restraining incorporations, especially during the 1830s: 
even in the few cases in which attempts in this sense were made, companies went public 
anyway before authorisation was granted (as in the famous case of Mutualité Industrielle)41. 
Last but not least, in the decades of our concern neither was income taxation levied (as in 
most other European countries, except Britain and Austria)42, nor were capital controls ever 
established. 
To sum up, the traditional depiction of Brussels as an early offshore financial centre can be 
effective in explaining its exceptional early-20th-century growth, not its first take-off in the 
mid-19th century. Rather than an abolition of restrictive regulation, the 1867 and 1873 reforms 
should be read as a reconciliation between legislation on the one hand, and a practice that had 
grown far beyond formal limits on the other hand. 
 
 
 
                                                          
40
 Chlepner, Le marché, pp. 46-47. The practice was so much dethatched from the letter that even official actors 
systematically circumvented the law. For instance, in order to prevent any sort of conflicts of interests, the Code 
de Commerce strictly forbade brokers to transact operations on their own account; however, the proceedings of 
the Administration Board of the NBB report that in January 1852, the Bank illegally discounted an amount of 
bills to broker François Depouhon. A very controversial protagonist of the Brussels business life (Gille, Lettres, 
passim), Depouhon would later on become a director of the NBB itself. 
41
 Brion and Moreau, The Société, pp. 77-79. As Belgian jurist Théophile Théate acutely pointed out, subjecting 
incorporation to governmental authorisation had an effect not in restricting, but in overheating financial activity: 
as a matter of fact, authorisation boiled down to a sort of quality certification for the general public, who was 
then induced to invest in new companies regardless of their true value. Théate, Les sociétés, p. 13. 
42
 Edwin R. A. Seligman, The Income Tax: A Study of the History, Theory, and Practice of Income Taxation at 
Home and Abroad (New York: Macmillan, 1914). 
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4. The National Currency and the Domestic Money Market 
 
According to the traditional view, the main achievement of the foundation of the NBB in 
1850 was the transformation of Belgium’s inadequate and fragile monetary system, which had 
suffered from two convertibility crises in two decades, into a modern and resilient one43. This 
idea is exacerbated by Buyst and Maes44, who conclude that during the 19th century the NBB 
acted as a mere provider of currency stability. However, the traditional emphasis on the 1839 
and 1848 crises as two big shocks for the Belgian franc does not seem to be corroborated by 
quantitative evidence. Figure 5 shows that in spite of formal inconvertibility, in neither 
occasion Belgium’s currency suffered from major depreciations with respect to the British 
pound, the French franc, or the Dutch gulden. The relative depreciation of the pound and 
appreciation of the gulden during the 1850s were tied to the fluctuations in the prices of 
bullion45 rather than to the action of the newly-created bank of issue. 
 
Figures 5 and 6 about here 
 
Yet the foundation of the NBB did actually mark a crucial event in Belgium’s monetary 
history, although this went beyond the narrow field of convertibility defence. Figure 6 reports 
market interest rates in London, Paris, and Antwerp for the period 1830-1860. It is possible to 
see that during the 1830s and 1840s, the Antwerp rate was more or less the same as the Paris 
one, while the London rate generally remained at a much lower level (except for a few short 
time lapses). Yet from 1851 a big change took place: Belgian market rates decoupled from 
both British and French ones, constantly remaining at the lower bound of the picture. Thus, 
the NBB’s action proved fundamental in making the Belgian franc not merely a stable, but 
most of all a low-yield currency. 
The ‘graduation’ of the domestic monetary system passed through the massive development 
of a sector of the money market that had stayed rather neglected by universal banks in the 
previous decades, viz. the market for acceptances – or bills of exchange. Figures 7 and 8 
provide two different albeit consistent indicators of the discount activities of Belgium’s three 
                                                          
43
 Charles A. Conant, The National Bank of Belgium (Washington: National Monetary Commission, 1910). 
44
 Erik Buyst and Ivo Maes, “Central Banking in Nineteenth-Century Belgium: Was the National Bank of 
Belgium a Lender of Last Resort?”, Financial History Review 15:2 (2008), pp. 153-173. 
45
 Stefano Ugolini, “The International Monetary System 1844-1870: Arbitrage, Efficiency, Liquidity”, mimeo. 
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biggest banks46. The boost given by the new bank of issue is impressive: the overall supply of 
credit to the acceptance market increased more than fivefold in the space of a decade47. Such a 
result was made possible by the penetration of the NBB in the provinces (see figure 9): 
through the creation of a large network of local branches (twenty-five provincial offices, plus 
the Brussels and Antwerp headquarters, were operating by 1860), the Bank enhanced the 
development of peripheral money markets, which had suffered in the previous decades from 
their isolation with respect to the core centres48. Such a penetration was easily enacted by the 
Bank through the diffusion of its banknotes, as fiduciary circulation had largely been 
underdeveloped in the provinces up to that moment. As a result of this process, within a 
decade from the NBB’s foundation a truly national and centralized monetary system had 
finally been established in Belgium. 
To sum up, the creation of the NBB gave a substantial contribution to the emergence of the 
Brussels financial centre not because it merely granted convertibility, but because it boosted 
the development of a larger and deeper domestic money market, which provided financial 
activities with a steady flow of funds49. Moreover, the Bank’s active discount policy proved 
successful in keeping domestic interest rates at lower levels than abroad, which no doubts 
made Belgium an attractive place for foreign borrowers. The way this result was achieved 
will be dealt with in the next section. 
 
Figures 7, 8, and 9 about here 
 
                                                          
46
 Figure 7, showing the yearly volume of bills discounted by the Belgium’s three biggest banks, provides the 
best indicator of the amount of credit supplied by the banking system to the economy. However, the series 
suffers from two flaws: a) data for BdB are missing for some years (1835, 1839, 1849, and 1850), and b) data for 
NBB include bills rediscounted with it by universal banks, so that the total volume of commercial paper 
discounted could be overestimated. In order to rule out the possibility that these shortcomings create major 
distortion in the overall picture, this is complemented by the complete series of end-of-year commercial 
portfolios for the three banks (figure 8). The two figures are mutually consistent. 
47
 However, it must be bore in mind that these sums also include bills denominated in foreign currencies 
discounted by Belgian banks (see below). 
48
 While big industrial plants had always had their bills discounted by universal banks in Brussels, smaller 
provincial firms had long been denied access to credit at the same conditions as metropolitan concerns. As a 
matter of fact, SG had mostly made use of its country branches for collecting savings rather than providing 
credit. In the end, the complaints of provincial borrowers provided one of the main arguments in favour of the 
foundation of a new bank of issue (Chlepner, La banque, pp. 310-312). 
49
 The fact that bills payable in another corner of the country would always be eligible for discount at the NBB 
provided a national standard that encouraged private short-term investment in acceptances throughout Belgium: 
in other words, the Bank’s action was effective not only on the demand side, but also on the supply side of the 
domestic money market. 
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5. The Foreign Exchange Market 
 
Among the main tasks envisaged for the newborn NBB, Finance Minister Frère-Orban 
included the creation of a large foreign exchange market in Belgium. This was meant to 
sustain the growth of the country’s weight in international commerce: up to that moment, 
many foreign transactions had to be cleared via London or Paris, which implied extra costs – 
and a loss of competitiveness – for Belgian traders50. The NBB actually proved very eager to 
enter the foreign exchange market, although mainly for a different reason than fulfilling the 
Frère-Orban’s expectations: as a matter of fact, playing with foreign currencies provided the 
Bank with the means for both boosting its revenues and smoothing the effects of external 
shocks on its own discount policy. All this ultimately allowed the NBB to keep lower 
domestic interest rates than abroad – as observed in the previous section51. 
These aspects of the NBB’s policy have received little attention up to now, but archival 
sources provide much information on the Bank’s astonishingly sophisticated action52. Figure 
10 shows that a large share of the bills discounted by the NBB were payable abroad. While 
almost the totality of bills denominated in Belgian francs were taken from the Belgian public, 
most of the bills denominated in foreign currencies were purchased abroad through the 
Bank’s correspondents53 – which proves that support to the foreign exchange market in 
Belgium was definitely not the driving force behind the NBB’s policy. Yet this does not mean 
that the public was not benefiting from the Bank’s action. Figure 11 compares the different 
interest rates offered by the NBB to open-window discounters. For most of the time the 
Bank’s counters did discount foreign bills on demand: claims on France (Belgium’s main 
trade partner) were customarily taken (with a few disruptions only), but also claims on Britain 
and the Netherlands were occasionally purchased from the public. The discount rate applied 
by the Bank was equal to the current onshore market rate on that currency, so that the bearer 
of the bill did not face any extra cost for having it paid – which actually proved a very 
                                                          
50
 Pierre Kauch, La Banque Nationale de Belgique, I (Brussels: NBB, 1950), p. 99. 
51
 The refined mechanisms through which this policy was worked out go beyond the scope of this chapter. On 
the NBB’s foreign portfolio management, see Stefano Ugolini, “The Origins of Foreign Exchange Policy: A 
Detailed Analysis of the Case of the National Bank of Belgium 1851-1853”, mimeo. 
52
 This section is mainly based on the proceedings of the NBB Administration Board: Archives générales du 
Royaume/Algemeen Rijksarchief (Brussels), Banque Nationale de Belgique/Nationale Bank van België, Procès-
Verbaux du Conseil d’Administration, 1851-1860. 
53
 A survey on the database used in Ugolini, “The Origins” (covering all NBB foreign exchange operations 
during the years 1851-1853), revealed that only 22.4% of the foreign bills discounted by the Bank in this period 
were taken from the Belgian public. 
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advantageous instrument for exporters. But there is more: figure 11 also shows that for quite a 
long period, the NBB applied a lower discount rate for ‘international’ bills denominated in 
Belgian francs (i.e. claims drawn on Belgium by a foreign agent) than for ‘fully domestic’ 
bills (i.e. claims drawn on Belgium by a Belgian agent). This means that since the beginning 
of its operations, the Bank was very keen on imposing an upper bound to the offshore interest 
rate on Belgian francs54, which acted as a cap on refinancing costs for foreign borrowers in 
Belgian currency. Last but not least, the Bank was also offering dealers in foreign currencies 
an additional instrument: repurchase agreements (i.e. the Bank bought foreign bills spot to 
resell them forward). As the repo rate was generally pegged to the Bank’s ‘international’ 
discount rate – and was thus often lower than the onshore market rate on the concerned 
currency – holders of foreign claims (like e.g. exporters) found it more advantageous to 
borrow on their security at the NBB rather than to discount them in the open market. As first-
class foreign merchant banks were also admitted to contract repos, this instrument must have 
played a role in enhancing the diffusion of the Belgian franc abroad. 
To sum up, even though the NBB’s involvement in foreign exchange operations was mostly 
dictated by other concerns than smoothing international transactions, the Bank’s action 
proved substantial in providing the necessary infrastructure for the emergence of a foreign 
exchange market in Brussels. By reducing the cost of transactions to and from Belgium, the 
Bank boosted the competitiveness of the Belgian franc as an international means of payment, 
thus laying the path towards its assumption of a first-stage role in the late 19th century55. 
 
Figures 10 and 11 about here 
 
                                                          
54
 Of course, as no capital controls existed at the time, the offshore and onshore interest rates were bound to be 
the same – which turns out to be the case: compare figures 6 and 11. Thus the differential between the NBB’s 
discount rates on ‘international’ and ‘fully domestic’ bills should be interpreted as a quality spread: while the 
first were typically drawn by major merchant bankers, the latter were drawn by small local agents and were thus 
much riskier assets for the Bank. 
55
 Marc Flandreau and Clemens Jobst, “The Ties that Divide: A Network Analysis of the International Monetary 
System 1890-1910”, Journal of Economic History 65:4 (2005), pp. 977-1007. Besides the development of a 
large foreign exchange market, Frère-Orban had a further ambition for Belgium’s financial place: the 
establishment of an international bullion market. In order to reach this aim, the Finance Minister tried to push the 
NBB to provide large lines of credit to bullion traders. Especially during the late 1860s and early 1870s, the 
Bank financed the vast operations of the Brussels mint, whose productivity had been taken to extraordinary 
levels by the recent installment of new powerful machinery: Kauch, La Banque, pp. 145-148). Such feverish 
minting activities will cost Belgium serious embarrassments with respect to the other members of the Latin 
Monetary Union after 1873: Henry Parker Willis, A History of the Latin Monetary Union: A Study of 
International Monetary Action (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1901). 
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Conclusions 
 
This chapter has reviewed different aspects of the growth of a brand new international 
financial centre by looking at the case of 19th-century Brussels; the overall picture emerging 
from this survey confirms that the chosen case deserves much attention, as its apparently 
‘atypical’ course opens new perspectives on the determinants of financial development. In 
this respect, it was possible to see that institutional (or semi-institutional) actors played by far 
the most important role in driving the process. During the 1830s, the expansion of the 
Brussels bourse was led by two universal banks that were rather spurious creatures: SG, 
created as a State bank under the Dutch rulers, performed the functions of Treasury’s agent 
and ‘national’ savings bank – while BdB, founded by a political lobby opposed to SG, was 
intended to replace the rival as Belgium’s proto-central bank. The crucial role of universal 
banks, controlled by a local elite lacking external connections, explains why Brussels (and not 
Antwerp) emerged as the national market for industrial equities. After the 1848 crisis SG and 
BdB became purely private concerns, but a major impulse to the financial development of the 
Brussels place was now given by the newborn NBB – the central bank, whose policies were 
often influenced by the government. The Bank encouraged the creation of a deep and truly 
national money market, and provided the necessary infrastructure for the internationalization 
of the Belgian franc. 
To conclude, the success story of 19th-century Brussels suggests that a general reappraisal of 
our knowledge about the emergence of financial centres might be wanted. Take the case of 
those centres whose development followed an apparently ‘typical’ path: given the role of 
(say) London or New York as commercial hubs, how much did the behaviour of institutional 
actors (like the Bank of England or the Federal Reserve respectively) concretely contribute to 
the growth and internationalization of financial markets in these places?56 To all likelihood, 
many elements are still to be clarified in our understanding of the historical dynamics of 
financial development – including the lessons lying there for the future. 
 
                                                          
56
 For an assessment of the action of the Bank of England and of the Federal Reserve limited to the establishment 
of international acceptance markets, see (respectively): Marc Flandreau and Stefano Ugolini, “Where It All 
Began: International Trade, the Market for Acceptances, and the Making of Lending of Last Resort in Britain”, 
mimeo; J. Peter Ferderer, “Institutional Innovation and the Creation of Liquid Financial Markets: The Case of 
Bankers’ Acceptances 1914-1934”, Journal of Economic History 63:3 (2003), pp. 666-694. 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Number of securities listed on the official bulletin of the Brussels Bourse, 1838-
1869. Source: Cours authentique de la bourse de Bruxelles (1838-1869). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Number of securities traded at the Brussels Bourse according to the press, 1834-
1860. Source: L’Indépendance belge (1834-1860). 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Number of securities traded at the Antwerp Bourse according to the press, 1834-
1860. Source: L’Indépendance belge (1834-1860). 
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Figure 3: Savings collection by Belgian universal banks (in million francs), 1830-1860. 
Source: Malou, Notice, p. XV; Chlepner, La banque, pp. 76-79. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Savings as a percentage of banks’ total liabilities, 1835-1848. Source: Malou, 
Notice, p. XV; Chlepner, La banque, pp. 76-79. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Exchange rates in Belgium (weekly), 1835-1839 and 1844-1860. 100 = Official 
metallic par. BEF: Belgian franc; FRF: French franc; GBP: British pound; NLG: Dutch 
gulden. Source: Moniteur belge (1835-1839); [Cours authentique de la] Bourse d’Anvers 
(1844-1851); Cours authentique de la bourse de Bruxelles (1852-1860). 
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Figure 6: Market interest rates in Antwerp, Paris, and London (monthly), 1830-1860. Source: 
Antwerp: Journal du commerce d’Anvers, from StudieCentrum voor Onderneming en Beurs 
(Antwerp), SCOB database (courtesy of Frans Buelens); Paris: Vincent Bignon, Marc 
Flandreau, and Stefano Ugolini, “Bagehot for Beginners: The Making of Lending of Last 
Resort Operations in the Mid-19th Century”, mimeo; London: Elmer Wood, English Theories 
of Central Banking Control 1819-1858 (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939), 
pp. 92-93, and Ugolini, “The International”. 
 
 
Figure 7: Volumes discounted by Belgian banks (yearly, in million francs), 1835-1860. Note: 
BdB data are missing for 1835, 1839, 1849, and 1850. Source: Malou, Notice, p. XX; 
Chlepner, La banque, p. 80; A. Van Schoubroeck, L’évolution des banques belges en fonction 
de la conjoncture de 1850 à 1872 (Gembloux: Duculot, 1951), p. 346; Moniteur belge (1852-
1861). 
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Figure 8: Commercial portfolios of Belgian banks (end-of-year, in million francs), 1835-1860. 
Source: Chlepner, La banque, pp. 76-79; Van Schoubroeck, L’évolution, pp. 346-349; 
Moniteur belge (1852-1861). 
 
 
 
Figure 9: NBB discounts: Headquarters vs. Branches (yearly, in million francs), 1851-1860. 
Source: Moniteur belge (1852-1861). 
 
 
 
Figure 10: NBB discounts: Domestic vs. Foreign (yearly, in million francs), 1851-1860. 
Source: Moniteur belge (1852-1861). 
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Figure 11: NBB open-window discount rates (weekly), 1851-1860. BEF: Belgian franc; FRF: 
French franc; GBP: British pound; NLG: Dutch gulden. Source: AGRB, NBB, Procès-
Verbaux du Conseil d’Administration (1851-1860). 
 
 
